Unobtrusive Maintenance: Temporal Complexity, Latent Category Control and the Stalled Emergence of the Cleantech Sector by Zietsma, C et al.
1 
 
UNOBTRUSIVE MAINTENANCE:  
TEMPORAL COMPLEXITY, LATENT CATEGORY CONTROL AND THE STALLED 





Dr. Charlene Zietsma (corresponding author) 
Smeal College of Business 
Room 416 Business Building 
The Pennsylvania State University 





Goodman School of Business,  
Brock University 
500 Glenridge Ave.,  
St. Catharines, ON,  




Angelique Slade Shantz  
Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta 
2-29D Business Building 
Edmonton, AB 









UNOBTRUSIVE MAINTENANCE:  
TEMPORAL COMPLEXITY, LATENT CATEGORY CONTROL AND THE STALLED 
EMERGENCE OF THE CLEANTECH SECTOR 
Abstract:  
Disruptive innovation changes the basis of competition within an industry and poses substantial 
threats for market incumbents. While researchers have focused on whether incumbents can 
successfully adapt, we know little about how potentially disruptive innovation may be avoided. 
Studying clean technology in Canada, we examine incumbent resistance when potentially 
disruptive technologies are seen as socially beneficial. We identify actions taken by incumbents 
and other socio-technical regime actors to respond to the issue while simultaneously enacting 
legitimate stabilizing mechanisms within the regime’s institutional infrastructure. Specifically, 
temporal and resource-based actions led to temporal complexity for disruptive cleantech 
entrepreneurs, and evaluation structuring work led to latent control of the cleantech category, 
privileging incumbents and resulting in unobtrusive maintenance. Our findings contribute to the 
disruptive innovation and institutional theory literatures by showing how disruption may be 
stalled by the enactment of legitimate elements of the institutional infrastructure rather than 
direct institutional defense.  
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Disruptions are “fundamental changes that disturb or re-order the ways in which organizations 
and ecosystems operate” (Ansari, Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2016a). Although disruptive 
innovations typically underperform incumbent technologies initially, the new innovations may 
eventually threaten to displace old technologies and the incumbent firms that support them 
(Danneels, 2004), as well as the institutional regimes in which they are embedded (Garud, Jain & 
Kumaraswamy, 2002; Greve & Taylor, 2000). Much of the literature reveals the difficulties 
encountered by incumbents as they respond to disruptive innovations (e.g., Andersen & 
Strandskov, 2008; Christensen, 1997; Danneels, 2004; Macher & Richman, 2004; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986), while a few studies show successful incumbent adaptation (Ansari & Krop, 
2012; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015; Roy & Sarkar, 2016).  
However, in each of these cases, researchers studied disruptive innovations that were 
successful, leaving the avoidance of disruption relatively unexplored. This success bias means 
that new entrants’ ability to destroy and disrupt established industries may be overstated, and the 
ability of the existing socio-technical regime to avoid disruption and maintain the status quo may 
be underestimated (Bergek, Berggren, Magnusson & Hobday, 2013; Geels, 2014). In fact, many 
potentially disruptive innovations likely do not fulfill their potential because incumbents—often 
in mutually dependent relationships with political actors, including politicians and civil servants 
such as regulators and funders (Geels, 2014; Unruh, 2000)—are embedded in systems oriented 
toward maintaining the status quo. This is particularly likely in regulated markets (Gurses & 
Ozcan, 2015), and situations in which disruptions challenge entire ecosystems of interrelated 
firms (Ansari, Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2016b; Garud et al., 2002). 
We study the avoidance of disruption in a particularly challenging situation: when an 
innovation addresses emerging societal needs, meaning that overt resistance is not a legitimate 
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response. The preservation of status quo arrangements (and thus the avoidance of disruption) has 
been studied in the literatures on institutional maintenance (e.g., Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; 
Maguire & Hardy, 2010) and sustainability transitions (e.g., Geels, 2014; Smink, Hekkart & 
Negro, 2015), where incumbents are viewed as one part of an institutional infrastructure that 
facilitates the smooth functioning and maintenance of the system (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; 
Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011; Hinings, Logue & Zietsma, 2017). 
Drawing on these literatures, we explore the following research question: How is disruptive 
innovation avoided to maintain the status quo? We examine this question using an inductive 
analysis of interviews, field notes and media data in the rich empirical context of the emergence 
of the Canadian cleantech sector. 
We find that, in a context where overt resistance to disruptive innovation is not 
legitimate, incumbents signal their legitimacy by speaking positively about the innovation, which 
potential disruptors perceive as opening a window of opportunity. However, legitimate 
stabilizing mechanisms associated with a tightly interlocking institutional infrastructure shape 
and block actions geared toward change, reproducing the temporal and evaluative structures 
underpinning the regime. Incumbents’ activation of the institutional infrastructure creates 
temporal complexity for entrepreneurs that undermines them and facilitates latent category 
control that bolsters incumbents, ultimately resulting in unobtrusive maintenance. We discuss the 
implications of our findings for the literatures on institutional maintenance, sustainability 
transitions and disruptive innovation. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Promise of Cleantech as a Disruptive Innovation 
Cleantech refers broadly to technology aimed at reducing or optimizing reliance on non-
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renewable resources by facilitating energy efficiency, clean energy, sustainable transportation, 
smart grids, green building practices, and power storage (CleanTech Alliance). Cleantech holds 
significant potential to disrupt existing energy systems, and consensus is growing around the 
need to shift to more sustainable technologies (Geels, 2014). While many examples of these 
technologies exist and are beginning to be implemented on a smaller scale, they have yet to 
threaten the dominance of traditional energy production.  
However, clean technologies have been identified as potentially disruptive innovations 
(Bergek et al., 2013), since they change the basis of competition by emphasizing factors such as 
greenhouse gas emissions and other sustainability criteria, while often underperforming 
conventional technologies on price. Disruptive innovations are defined as new technologies, 
products or business models that emerge with a “different set of features…relative to existing 
products” (Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006: 190), thereby altering “the bases of competition by 
changing the performance metrics along which firms compete” (Danneels, 2004: 249). 
Disruptors often focus initially on customers who have lower performance standards than 
mainstream customers, but want unique features not available in existing products. Over time, 
improvements in these innovations threaten incumbents (Christiansen, 1997; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003).  
Yu and Chang (2010) reviewed the literature on disruptive innovation, which has been 
conceptualized in a number of different ways, including innovation attributes such as 
revolutionary vs. evolutionary (Florida & Kenney 1990); competency-enhancing vs. 
competency-destroying (Tushman & Anderson, 1986); modular vs. architectural (Henderson & 
Clark 1990); and sustaining vs. disrupting (Adner, 2002). Of particular note is Govindarajan and 
Kopalle’s (2006) innovation measure which accounts for both high-end and low-end disruptions 
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via a matrix of traditional attribute performance and cost, drawing attention to the possibility that 
disruptive innovations initially could have inferior mainstream attributes and cost more, yet still 
disrupt by offering other value propositions (Yu & Chang, 2010). Although most researchers 
have emphasized cost, some have considered other attributes of technologies (e.g., wind, electric 
vehicles) that initially are more expensive and may even be inferior based on mainstream 
attributes, but offer some new value or “values” proposition (Kirsch, 2000; Pacheco, York, & 
Hargrave, 2014; Sine & Lee, 2009; York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2016). With a few noted 
exceptions, these types of innovations and the value propositions they provide beyond more 
traditional improvements on cost and functionality are underrepresented in the literature (Yu & 
Chang, 2010).  
Disruptive innovation also has been examined as a multi-actor process (Yu & Chang, 
2010). Theorists have focused primarily on disruption as the focal outcome of this process, 
paying particular attention to why incumbent firms have such difficulty responding (Christensen 
& Raynor, 2003; Dewald & Bowen, 2010), suggesting that innovations tend to destroy the value 
of incumbents’ competencies and resource endowments (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986). In the typical pattern, incumbents dismiss initially inferior technologies or 
business models; as challengers improve their performance, incumbents struggle to catch up and 
often are replaced (Daneels, 2004). In this body of work, scholars cite internal factors, such as 
the inability or unwillingness of managers or employees to see or act on promising technologies 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Denning, 2005; Henderson, 2006; Murase, 2003); and market or 
customer dynamics, such as incumbents’ inability to notice or address changes in the market or 
customer needs (Yu & Chang, 2010). Relatively fewer scholars have studied external factors 
such as contextual or environmental features (Yu & Chang, 2010).  
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More recently, scholars have challenged these explanations, suggesting that they 
overstate new entrants’ abilities to disrupt established industries, and underestimate incumbents’ 
capabilities to respond (Bergek et al., 2013). Incumbents may use a wide range of strategies to 
deal with disruption, including inaction (Charitou and Markides, 2003), resistance (Markides, 
2006), adoption (Christensen & Raynor, 2003), or resilience (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Dewald 
& Bowen, 2010). A firm may opt to augment its core business with additional products or 
services to defend against the impact of disruption (Howells, 2002), or adopt the new 
technology, either internally or as a separate enterprise (Lange, Boivie & Henderson, 2009). 
While this work focuses predominantly on incumbents’ abilities to incorporate 
innovations, several studies have demonstrated that incumbents attempt to resist disruptive 
innovations to maintain their market advantages, thereby disrupting the disruptors (Hargrave & 
Van de Ven, 2009). For example, in the case of the digital video recorder, incumbents in the 
television industry attempted to block TiVo’s market entry by coordinating collective action 
amongst network actors, forging alliances with TiVo’s competitors, and blocking access to 
airtime (Ansari et al., 2016b). Similarly, in the case of pay TV, incumbents and disruptors 
engaged in framing contests and collective action to influence regulations (Gurses & Ozcan, 
2015). When Sun Microsystems launched its Java technology, Microsoft first tried to discredit 
Java and forge alliances with competitors, and later extended Java in ways that compromised its 
compatibility (Garud et al., 2002). In many instances, disruptive innovations “unfold as ‘trials of 
strength’ (Latour, 1987), between multi-party networks of firms as they try to convince industry 
members to adopt their innovations” (Garud, Teurtscher & Van de Ven, 2013: 789). The stakes 
are high, and innovations are translated into different forms to fit the needs of multiple 
constituents, often involving strategic framing and attempts to bridge relational and temporal 
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complexities (Garud et al., 2013).  
Yet, each of these are examples of products or services that were not widely seen as 
fulfilling a pressing societal need; as a result, incumbents’ attempts to block these disruptions did 
not need to be couched in actions that appeared to embrace them. These examples also primarily 
did not involve different types of actors; rather, incumbents typically acted in concert. Thus, it 
remains unclear how incumbents’ responses may change when their interests are closely aligned 
with other powerful institutional actors. More broadly, the avoidance of disruption, particularly 
when overt resistance is not a legitimate response, has not been studied; a gap therefore remains 
in our understanding about when and why potentially disruptive technologies fail to disrupt, 
particularly when these innovations address constituent demands. This is surprising, since failing 
to disrupt is a highly likely outcome of attempted disruption given incumbents’ power and the 
significant resource commitments, existing infrastructure, and general path dependency 
associated with existing products, services and business models (Garud et al., 2013).  
Institutional Maintenance in the Face of Disruptive Innovation 
On the other hand, institutional theorists have much to say about the processes and mechanisms 
underlying the maintenance of existing institutional arrangements, as well as the work performed 
by actors to maintain them. Maintenance occurs not only through the deliberate efforts of actors, 
but also through systemic institutional forces, since institutions themselves are “repetitively 
activated, socially constructed, controls” (Jepperson, 1991: 145). Studies have documented that 
these mechanisms and processes range from strategic efforts to more systemic forms of 
maintenance.  
Strategic Institutional Maintenance. A range of studies show how organizations can 
strategically resist institutional change, at both the organizational and field levels. At the 
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organizational level, multiple studies have documented that established incumbents resist 
institutional pressure to change, instead seeking to maintain the status quo and protect their 
interests (Anand & Peterson, 2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Hensman, 2003; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Munir, 2005; Oliver, 1991). For example, auto manufacturers in Germany resisted 
pressure to adopt diesel particulate filters (Guerard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013), coffee sellers in 
the Netherlands resisted the introduction of fair trade coffee (Ingenbleek & Reinders, 2013), gas 
lighting companies resisted the introduction of electric lighting (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001) and 
the recording industry resisted the advent of peer music sharing (Hensmans, 2003). In each case, 
incumbents mobilized networks of other organizations in the field, including policymakers, to 
resist with them.  
Documented strategic responses to institutional pressures encompass avoidance, defiance, 
manipulation, compromise and compliance (Oliver, 1991), with powerful incumbents tending to 
respond more overtly through avoidance, defiance and manipulation. Such resistance can be seen 
as institutional maintenance work (i.e., intentional action to maintain institutions; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006), which involves both active, episodic work and the more systemic work of 
establishing systems for self-reproduction (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009). Maintenance 
work includes efforts to embed and routinize practices in day-to-day activities, rules, roles and 
resources; valorize and demonize practices; police practice use; and use deterrence to establish 
barriers to change (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Scholars also have identified more active types 
of defensive maintenance work. Facing pressure to change, incumbents are likely to craft a 
resistant and defensive field stance that supports their activities within the system (Clemente & 
Roulet, 2015); collectively, “dominant incumbents ‘construct’ practices as effective, beneficial, 
appropriate, inevitable, and so on (i.e., as unproblematic)” (Maguire & Hardy, 2009: 150). Since 
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elites have established centrality (Farjoun, 2002), communication networks (Lounsbury, 2001), 
and legitimacy (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), they are well positioned to maintain 
institutional arrangements.  
Scholars who study sustainability transitions have revealed similar institutional 
maintenance accounts, not only at the incumbent or organizational level, but also at the broader 
regime level. In articles by Geels (2014), and Unruh (2000), political actors and incumbent 
business actors in mutually dependent relationships comprise “socio-technical regimes” or 
“techno-institutional complexes” which work in concert to maintain extant institutional 
arrangements. Geels (2014: 35), for example, described anecdotally how “incumbent regime 
actors used instrumental, discursive, material and institutional forms of power to resist climate 
change-related pressures and to reposition themselves for low-carbon futures without 
fundamental system change.” In his example, government actors asserted solutions to climate 
change which privileged incumbent firms, reframed problems in terms that favored incumbents, 
provided resources to incumbents to improve their technical feasibility while marginalizing 
alternative paths, and referred to market logics to justify not taking action to support climate 
change efforts (Geels, 2014). Smink et al. (2015) showed the actions incumbent firms took to 
influence governments to maintain the status quo, with a particular emphasis on framing and 
standard setting activities, for example, to block innovations in the LED lighting and biofuel 
industries. While this research stream uses primarily exemplary cases to show the active 
resistance strategies available to powerful regimes fighting sustainability transitions (Markard, 
Raven & Truffer, 2012), more empirically grounded work is needed to understand the underlying 
mechanisms that connect regime actions to institutional impacts in the context of disruptive 
innovations more broadly.  
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Systemic Institutional Maintenance. Not all institutional maintenance is strategic. Maintenance 
can also be systemic, whereby institutions are upheld by an institutional infrastructure, or those 
“mechanisms of social coordination by which embedded actors interact with one another in 
predictable ways” (Zietsma, Groenewegen, Logue, & Hinings, 2017: 392). Two key elements of 
this institutional infrastructure that are particularly relevant to disruptive innovation are temporal 
issues and categories. Orlikowski and Yates (2002: 684) argued that “temporal structures emerge 
from and are embedded in the varied and ongoing social practices of people in different 
communities, and at the same time…such temporal structures powerfully shape those practices.” 
According to Garud et al. (2013), time is a recognized factor in innovation processes. Often, 
temporal issues are conceptualized as technical in nature, whereby systemic asynchronies in 
temporal rhythms among the different actors and elements of an innovation and its ecosystem 
can lead to delays in the emergence of supportive infrastructure (Ansari & Garud, 2009), and 
unanticipated roadblocks (Pickering, 1993). This temporal complexity generally presents 
significant barriers to innovation (Garud & Gehman, 2012). Yet, more recent studies have 
revealed time’s strategic side: temporal institutional work involves “how [actors] construct, 
navigate, and capitalize on timing norms in their attempts to change institutions” (Granqvist & 
Gustafsson, 2016: 1010; emphasis in original). In studying the efforts of institutional change 
agents, Granqvist and Gustafsson (2016: 1009) identified three forms of temporal institutional 
work. Entraining is a “top-down, routinized, reproductive form” in which a dominant, perhaps 
external player imposes timing norms on those in a field. More bottom up, issue-driven forms of 
temporal institutional work include constructing urgency and enacting momentum. They argued 
that change agents can sequentially use these strategies to create windows of opportunity for 
their projects (via constructing urgency and entraining), facilitate synchronicity (by enacting 
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momentum and entraining), and strengthen perceptions that change is irreversible (by enacting 
momentum and constructing urgency).  
Categories, or “meaningful conceptual systems” that classify organizations, issues, 
technologies or other elements into groups with specific attributes and meanings (Navis & 
Glynn, 2010: 440), are another component of institutional infrastructure and a second key 
element of innovation described by Garud et al. (2013). Categories can be used strategically, for 
example by promoting (or deciding not to promote) certain attributes (Gehman & Grimes, 2017). 
Categories also can be systemic elements used to stabilize meaning across industries, providing 
“industry-wide technological frames” that hold “the different actors of an ecosystem in place” 
(Garud et al., 2013: 790). Framing makes “some aspects of a perceived reality…more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 52), and 
thus can be used to define or redefine what a category means, particularly when it is seen as 
ambiguous (Garud et al., 2002; Smink et al., 2015). More specifically, when incumbents face 
disruptive pressure to change, they often attempt to reframe category criteria or to frame their 
own actions or technologies as part of the category (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013; Maguire 
& Hardy, 2009). For example, proponents of nuclear energy argued that it is a critical source of 
sustainable energy because it is emission-free (Garud, Gehman & Karnoe, 2010), and political 
and incumbent actors reframed concerns in the energy sector by shifting the focus from climate 
change to energy security and affordability, thereby privileging nuclear and fossil fuel options 
(Geels, 2014). This exemplifies how aligned incumbents frame categories to emphasize how 
disruptive innovations do not fit the prototype of a legitimate category. In summary, taking an 
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institutional perspective on disruptive innovation can provide insights into the circumstances and 
mechanisms underlying failed disruptive innovation. 
METHODOLOGY 
We address our research question in the context of clean technology and renewable energy in 
two Canadian provinces, British Columbia and Ontario, where the majority of cleantech startups 
in Canada are located. Although significant pressure for disruption exists, these technologies do 
not yet threaten the dominance of traditional energy production.  
Context of Clean Technology in British Columbia and Ontario 
According to the Clean Technology Trade Alliance, clean technology includes “pollution 
control, resource reduction and management, end of life strategy, waste reduction, energy 
efficiency, carbon mitigation and profitability.”1 Renewable energy refers to energy derived from 
renewable resources or waste, such as solar, wind, biomass, tidal, geothermal and wave energy.  
Over the last 10 years, pressure for clean technology and renewable energy has risen in 
Canada generally, and in British Columbia and Ontario specifically, in response to concerns 
about climate change, energy security, the depletion of oil reserves, and expensive extraction 
techniques such as those used in the Alberta tar sands and in deepwater drilling and fracking. 
Pundits tout clean energy and cleantech as the key to competitive advantage and economic 
renewal (Friedman, 2007), and politicians often promote the advantages of green job creation.  
In sentiment, Canadians also appear inclined to support action on climate change. For 
example, results of a poll conducted by the Vancouver Sun published on September 4, 2012 
reveal that “British Columbians put a top priority on using sustainable energy sources and 
conservation” and are more accepting of measures such as carbon taxes, which have been in 
effect in the province since 2008. In Ontario, a Green Energy and Green Economy Act was 
15 
 
passed in 2009 with the intention to support renewable energy and create green jobs. In general, 
cleantech and renewable energy were election issues during the study period, with increased 
media coverage during periods leading up to elections (see Figure 2 in the data section).  
Interdependence in the ecosystem. Electrical energy generation and transmission is 
organized provincially and is heavily regulated in Canada. BC Hydro, a crown (public) 
corporation, has a near-monopoly on power generation and transmission in BC, although the 
government requires it to purchase a small amount of power from independent producers. In 
Ontario, Hydro One, which is owned by the Ontario government and regulated by the Ontario 
Energy Board, controls 97% of electricity transmission. Most clean technology firms require 
cooperation from incumbent firms and government intervention to sell their technologies. For 
example, cleantech entrepreneurs selling energy conservation (smart meters, smart grid devices 
or systems, etc.) or energy generation technologies (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines, co-
generation technologies, biomass converters, etc.) generally must obtain the permission of BC 
Hydro or Hydro One before they or their customers can connect to the electrical grid.2 
Companies that develop technologies for the automotive industry must partner with automakers 
to get them installed in vehicles. Biofuel technology entrepreneurs must work with oil companies 
to add biofuels to traditional fuels and with automakers to develop engines that can work with 
biofuels. Green building technologies must be adopted by construction firms, and building codes 
originally written for incumbent technologies often must be modified to reflect both regulatory 
and business practice changes. Thus, in most contexts, cleantech entrepreneurs must work not 
only with incumbent firms to facilitate the adoption of technologies, but also with governments 
to ensure supportive regulations. 
In addition, mutual dependence exists between governments and incumbents. Fossil fuel 
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incumbents and automakers have very strong relationships with the federal government, 
electricity firms have strong relationships with provincial governments, and waste removal and 
construction firms often have strong ties to municipal governments. Incumbents rely on 
politicians and regulators to establish a favorable regulatory environment, and the government 
relies on incumbents to power the economy, both literally and figuratively. Due to these mutual 
dependencies, and similar to other jurisdictions, political actors and incumbent firms in Canada 
can be viewed as components of a socio-technical regime (Unruh, 2000; Geels, 2014; see Figure 
1) in which institutional arrangements provide significant benefits, including tax revenue, 
employment and political capital for governments, and profit and power for firms.  
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Thus, the cleantech context is ideal for exploring institutional maintenance in response to 
disruptive innovation. Clean technologies resonate with Canadians, who support their adoption, 
and cleantech companies frequently are touted in the media for creating jobs and economic 
prosperity. With these characteristics, incumbent firms such as producers of energy (oil, gas, coal 
and electricity) and governments face pressure to support and implement these disruptive 
technologies. Nevertheless, according to an article in the Toronto Star published on November 
12, 2011, experts have repeatedly labeled the cleantech sector as “stalled.”  
Data 
Interviews. Between 2010 and 2011, we interviewed 56 cleantech entrepreneurs in Ontario (24) 
and British Columbia (32), along with seven incumbents and policymakers, including 
government regulators, a government funder of clean technology, a manager who dealt with 
renewable energy at an electrical utility, and lobbyists for clean technology. On average, 
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cleantech entrepreneurial firms in British Columbia had 43 full time equivalent employees 
(range: 1–580) and were 9 years old (range: 1–25) and those in Ontario had 59 full time 
equivalent employees (range: 1–850) and were 11 years old (range: 4-25). Semi-structured in-
person interviews lasted approximately 90 minutes each and were recorded and transcribed. 
Questions focused on the nature of interviewees’ work as well as successes and challenges in the 
cleantech industry.   
Newspaper articles. We collected 2,477 newspaper articles covering clean technology, 
renewable energy and energy conservation and related terms from 2001–2013 from the main 
provincial newspapers. This timeframe was ideal, as it enabled us to explore the early stages of 
the sector’s formation through its emergence as a significant issue for society. We searched the 
Toronto Star (1,280) and the Vancouver Sun (1,197) for the terms green energy, alternative 
energy, renewable energy, clean energy, cleantech* and green tech* using Factiva. We excluded 
any articles not related to clean technology or renewable energy in Ontario or British Columbia. 
The Vancouver Sun is the main newspaper in British Columbia, and the Toronto Star is the daily 
newspaper with the largest circulation in Canada. Early in the study period, only a few relevant 
articles were published each year, but this number increased to 289 articles in a single year at the 
peak of cleantech’s emergence in British Columbia in 2009. Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
articles in the two newspapers over time. Peaks in coverage for both newspapers correspond with 
provincial election years, suggesting that clean technology and renewable energy were key 
election issues. For in-text citations, we cite the newspaper name (the Vancouver Sun is 
abbreviated as Sun, while the Toronto Star is abbreviated as Star) and the publication date.  
-------------------------------------------- 




Archival Data. Using data from interviews and newspaper articles, we also assembled 
publicly available data on projected and actual uses of funds from the major provincial and 
national funding sources available to cleantech entrepreneurs in Ontario and British Columbia 
during the study period. Data from Sustainable Development Technology Canada ($250 million), 
NRCan’s Technology Early Action Measures ($1.16 billion), and BC’s Innovative Clean Energy 
Fund ($77 million) enabled us to verify the accuracy of accounts from interviews and the media.  
Data Limitations. While we acknowledge that a perfect data set would include more 
interviews with incumbent firms and governments engaged in institutional maintenance, this was 
made difficult by the very nature of institutional maintenance and the growing legitimacy of 
clean technology. Indeed, the few interviews we conducted with incumbents were difficult to 
obtain, and interviewees appeared to carefully discuss only organizationally-approved 
perspectives, essentially reiterating public statements. We used these interviews to augment and 
challenge media accounts (which often quoted incumbents directly), data on funding programs, 
and the entrepreneurs’ accounts. We triangulated across data sources to corroborate the findings.  
Data Analysis 
We used an inductive qualitative approach to analyze the data in four stages, iterating between 
our data and the literature (Miles & Huberman, 1994). First, we used media articles and industry 
events to create an extensive event history database of sector emergence in each jurisdiction to 
better understand the context for the actions of entrepreneurs, incumbents and political actors. 
Through this analysis, we noted that the institutional context appeared to significantly affect the 
emergence of the cleantech sector, so we organized our subsequent analysis around institutional 
maintenance. 
Second, we used open coding to identify first-order categories in the interview transcripts 
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and media coverage. We coded evaluative comments about cleantech and its challenges, using 
codes such as “the time is right,” “significant growth,” “resource commitments,” “changing 
policies/support,” “delays,” “need for more testing/piloting,” “not ready yet,” “economic 
metrics,” “cleaner tech,” etc. Then, we grouped related codes together in second-order themes. 
Comparing the similarities and differences among entrepreneurs’ accounts, media articles and 
incumbent/government reports enabled us to add further nuance to our emerging themes. 
In the third stage, we iterated between our data and the literature, grouping themes into 
aggregate categories that explained the phenomenon and extended our understanding of how 
disruptive innovation is avoided when overt resistance is not a legitimate response. Finally, in a 
fourth stage we searched the data for links between aggregate dimensions and outcomes, as 
described by entrepreneurs, incumbents, government representatives and the media. For 
example, entrepreneurs explained that they were “going out of business” due to the “temporal 
complexity” that had emerged from incumbents’ paradoxical opening of a “window of 
opportunity” for technology that was “not ready yet.” We used these emic causal interpretations 
to construct a process map of institutional maintenance in response to potential disruption.  
FINDINGS: UNOBTRUSIVE MAINTENANCE  
Our findings reveal the difficulties cleantech entrepreneurs faced in disrupting a highly 
institutionalized socio-technical regime (see Figure 3 for a model of the findings and Table I for 
representative quotes from the data). In response to public demand for action on the cleantech 
issue, incumbents and political actors in the regime framed a window of opportunity that 
included resource commitments and emphasized urgency and speed to support this potentially 
disruptive innovation. However, two interlocking elements of the socio-technical regime had 
particular influence over the enactment of the opportunity: the temporal structuring of political 
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bodies, regulators and incumbent firms based on cyclicality and stability; and evaluation 
structuring involving a value calculus that reinforced the status quo. These two interlocking 
elements were underpinned by legitimate stabilizing mechanisms, which are taken-for-granted 
institutions (rules, structures, beliefs, practices, values, etc.) embedded in the institutional 
infrastructure. These legitimate stabilizing mechanisms entrenched a value calculus and temporal 
rhythms which favored incumbents. Based on these stabilizing mechanisms, political actors and 
incumbents framed doubt about the category of cleantech “not ready yet,” and enacted delays 
and intermittence, resulting in temporal complexity for entrepreneurs. In addition, regime actors 
extended the cleantech category to include their own technologies as “cleaner tech.” Incumbents 
then applied the status quo economic value calculus to both clean and cleaner tech innovations, 
resulting in category absorption by incumbents of the cleantech category. This combination of 
actions and stabilizing mechanisms led to unobtrusive institutional maintenance: new entrants 
were undermined, incumbents were bolstered, and disruption was avoided.  
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Framing a Window of Opportunity 
Responding to public pressure, politicians and incumbents framed a window of opportunity for 
cleantech by emphasizing urgency and speed and announcing resource commitments. 
Urgency and speed. In response to public pressure, regime actors framed a window of 
opportunity for cleantech and renewable energy: “BC’s Premier called BC’s renewable energy 
industry a ‘sleeping giant’” (Sun, 12 Apr 2005), heralding “an unprecedented opportunity to 
shape the character of the future global energy system...that we can’t afford to miss” (Sun, 24 
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Nov 2005). The Ontario government also emphasized speed in “aggressively pursuing both 
renewables and conservation” (Star, 20 Feb 2010). The Premier of Ontario said: “The Green 
Energy Act is designed to speed those kinds of projects along, by removing roadblocks that have 
typically emerged during municipal approval processes” (Star, 11 May 2009).  
Resource commitments. Those in government ministries promised to provide support for 
the implementation of cleantech projects. One regulator explained: “We’ll ask them, ‘What do 
you need? What do you need to make this work here?’ We’ll look at what tools we have and 
we’ll see what we can do” (F02, Regulator). Additionally, the government developed policies to 
support cleantech that included substantial funding programs:  
We’ve got a couple of programs. One that you may be familiar with is called the 
[funding] program that is essentially a funding program providing grants and incentives 
to improve energy efficiency in the built environment...in some other areas, we have 
created the [program fund]… It was established as a policy action from the [action plan] 
and it was established as a $25 million per year fund to support the development and 
deployment of innovative clean energy technologies. (F02, Regulator) 
 
The regulator went on to describe 11 different funding platforms/programs in the province that 
were designed to support cleantech because 
we’ve recognized it needs some special attention and some special strategic development 
support to grow, hence our creation of the [fund] and the [network] and our interest in 
further supporting that development through things like a feed-in tariff that we’ve 
proposed or that was indicated in the [act]. (F02, Regulator) 
 
Incumbents, too, signaled resource allocations for cleantech in the form of purchasing 
programs. For example, utilities in both Ontario and BC announced they would purchase clean 
power from independent distributors: “Both Energy Minister Richard Neufeld and BC Hydro 
CEO Bob Elton have been making signals in recent days that indicate greater opportunities are 
looming for private-sector companies to join Hydro’s grid” (Sun, 27 Oct 2004). Requests for 
proposals were issued and large oil and gas companies offered investment programs to which 
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cleantech entrepreneurs could apply for equity funding. By signaling urgency and speed and 
committing resources, regime actors framed a window of opportunity for cleantech 
entrepreneurs.  
The Interlocking Infrastructure of the Socio-technical Regime 
Two elements of the socio-technical regime’s institutional infrastructure influenced the 
enactment of these cleantech opportunities: temporal structuring based on the existing temporal 
rhythms within the regime; and evaluation structuring based on the existing value calculus. 
These elements of the institutional infrastructure acted as legitimate stabilizing mechanisms. 
Temporal structuring. Politicians, who are focused on obtaining electoral support, and 
funders and regulators, who respond to political directives, have intermittent timing norms based 
on the political cycle. Politicians attempt to create and enact policies or funding programs 
supported by voters. Given 4-year political cycles, issues become more or less salient based on 
their relevance to voters or the ability to implement solutions prior to the next election. Because 
of this cycle, government funding program managers and regulators expect change to occur: “In 
[province], the government has created a policy envelope…where they dictate…What is the 
energy policy? What are the desired outcomes?” (F01, Utility Company). Moreover:  
This ministry and this agenda is a creature of the government’s economic agenda and 
little more. A government could make choices at any time, and one would expect that 
certainly, following an election is usually one of those times that governments make 
hard-nosed choices either to do more of, do less of, or something in between… 
Government, essentially with the stroke of a pen, could decide more, less, same. (F05, 
Government Funder) 
 
Electrical utilities, as government-owned corporations, frequently must meet targets set 
by the government. Yet, electrical utilities require stability and security to protect the integrity of 
the electricity grid in the long-term. Utilities are expected to entrain themselves to political 
timing norms while simultaneously ensuring stability and security, resulting in complex temporal 
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structuring. Politicians frequently give utilities ample time (i.e., years) to implement policy 
changes, and utilities usually implement those changes close to deadlines in the interest of 
maintaining stability, knowing that policies might change in the meantime. Furthermore, beyond 
direct political intervention, utilities are governed by a regulator which must approve significant 
changes: “Every contract that we sign, every amendment in the contract, has to have [the 
regulator’s] approval” (F01, Utility Company), which introduces delays and the possibility that a 
change will not be implemented. To avoid compliance with political directives, utility 
incumbents can apply to the regulator, which occasionally disapproves associated expenditures, 
resulting in cancelled programs or contracts. Thus, although politicians issue directives with 
respect to utilities, temporal structuring introduces the potential for those directives to be ignored 
or delayed substantially to ensure long-term stability within the regime:  
The first draft of the Integrated Power System Plan, released in 2007, was sent back to 
the drawing board in 2008 by then energy minister George Smitherman, who wanted a 
greater focus on renewable energy and conservation. It has not resurfaced since then. In 
the absence of a plan, “conservation policy has been made through directives in a closed 
and seemingly ad hoc fashion,” reported Miller. (Star, 5 May 2010) 
 
Evaluation structuring. While managing these competing demands for change and 
stability, new opportunities and investments must be evaluated. Regulators, funders and 
incumbents in the energy sector’s socio-technical regime use a value calculus that prioritizes 
economic metrics. As a utility manager explained, regulators “review things from an economic 
basis;” “they try to do the very best that they can, but their job is an economic regulator. And 
whoever’s bringing forward something has to prove that what they’re doing is prudent and in 
their ratepayers’ best interest” (F01, Utility Company). Even the description of consumers as 
“ratepayers” reflects the primacy of economics. Although regulators worked with incumbents to 
implement governmental priorities (e.g., job creation, environmental protection, etc.), this was 
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always balanced by financial concerns: 
Our policy and legislative development is ongoing… to the extent that we can, knowing 
what other interests government has to balance and what… the chequebook looks like in 
the province, we make incremental steps to better improve what is happening… for this 
sector. (F02, Regulator) 
 
By prioritizing economic metrics over carbon reductions, evaluators privileged status quo 
technologies with proven business models.  
Another key feature of this economic evaluation was the careful consideration of new 
costs while taking old costs for granted. Subsidies for incumbent technologies were decided long 
ago and had become institutionalized through an “incremental” budgeting process that bases 
current public financial decisions on prior years’ budgets (Greenwood, 1984). This structure 
functions as a stabilizing mechanism that ensures continuity in the regime. Furthermore, in 
calculations of electricity rates, the cost of capital infrastructure for hydroelectric dams and 
nuclear power typically is not included in pricing. A government official explained: “It’s…a 
blessing for us here in British Columbia to have had for many decades a reliable source of clean 
electricity...that has been paid for long ago, so all we’re really paying for right now in the 
utilization of electricity is the cost of operating the system” (F02, Regulator). As such, 
evaluations not only prioritized economic concerns in the value calculus, but the economic 
calculus itself was lopsided, focusing on all costs associated with new technologies, but only 
some of the costs associated with existing technologies. 
To ensure the reproduction of the existing value calculus, the governance of energy in 
Canada includes core members of the regime. For example, at the time of writing, among the 
eight permanent board members on Canada’s National Energy Board (a regulatory agency), five 
were employed in the oil and gas industry, one represented the government of Alberta (which 
depends heavily on the oil industry), and two were consultants who provided expertise on 
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Indigenous affairs affected by energy and land use.3  
 Overall, temporal and evaluation structuring – and the stabilizing mechanisms of the 
institutional infrastructure that underpin them – comprise a tightly connected system of meanings 
and practices that can block innovations that threaten regime stability. Thus, despite the window 
of opportunity reflected in regime actors’ positive rhetoric and resource commitments to 
cleantech, entrepreneurs still faced challenges enacted through these legitimate stabilizing 
mechanisms.  
Time-based Actions in Response to the Cleantech Issue  
Entrepreneurs responded to the window of opportunity by entering the sector, as the window 
aligned with the needs of entrepreneurs to pursue timely opportunities with the promise of quick 
results. Although the window provided evidence that regime actors were taking cleantech 
seriously, they were simultaneously enacting legitimate stabilizing mechanisms from the 
regime’s institutional infrastructure, framing doubt about the cleantech category and enacting 
existing temporal structuring, which created temporal complexity for the entrepreneurs.  
Category doubt. Based on legitimate stabilizing mechanisms that embedded perceptions 
of the category in the temporal structuring of the regime, actors framed the new category of 
technologies as important, but expressed doubts about implementation readiness. One 
government funder animated this perspective: “There are roadblocks, for lack of a better word, 
for Environment and Energy. Because that’s just the nature of where the technologies are” (F05, 
Government Funder). A BC Hydro engineer expressed similar views: “The technologies could 
never replace conventional hydro or gas generation because they are dependent on weather and 
tide” (Sun, 6 Nov 2002). Similarly, oil and gas company executives publicly stated: “Nothing is 
going to render fossil fuels obsolete tomorrow or make renewables suddenly technically and 
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commercially viable and available” (Sun, 25 Mar 2010). 
Project failures were attributed to technological and financial issues associated with 
increased risk. A utility manager explained, “They’re willing to take a lot of risk on, but at the 
end of the day it’s just not there yet” (F01, Utility Company). Although a window of opportunity 
had been opened, indicating speed and urgency, doubt was cast on the viability of cleantech, 
emerging from the risk-averse, stability-focused temporal rhythms of incumbents and regulators. 
Temporal complexity. Accessing the window of opportunity required entrepreneurs to 
conform to the timing norms of the regime, both in terms of political cycles and incumbent 
stability, and antithetical to the speed and urgency that dominated conceptions of entrepreneurial 
opportunity exploitation. Entrepreneurs noted that it was difficult for long-term technology 
development projects to fit into the 4-year political cycle. For example, “Even if you do a run-of-
the-river project, as they did with the [name], it’s about a 5- to 10-year program.” (ECM04, 
Entrepreneur). Such projects would be completed under a subsequent government after political 
attention had shifted. Often, funding programs were announced before an election and then 
changed or discontinued before entrepreneurs could take advantage of them: “Since their last 
electoral victory in 2011, the Liberals have started throttling back their green-at-any-cost energy 
vision…Soon after the 2011 election, the government initiated a review of its program to buy 
wind and solar power” (National Post, 12 Mar 2013).  
 Entrepreneurs also had to conform to the timing norms of incumbents. Because utility 
incumbents had become accustomed to politicians’ temporary, cyclical commitments and 
because they needed to ensure stable supply, they often delayed enactment of policy directives to 
balance temporal requirements. For example, the government mandated that BC Hydro purchase 
specific amounts of green power, so BC Hydro announced a call for proposals in June 2008.4 
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After the deadline (i.e., after entrepreneurs had spent thousands of dollars to have their proposals 
considered), BC Hydro asked its regulator for a delay:  
BC Hydro has put together a carefully considered argument for delaying its green-power 
needs. In a 100-page submission to the commission, it says higher prices for electricity 
passed on to its customers, along with conservation measures, will mean energy savings 
and reduced consumption. (Sun, 7 Jan 2009) 
  
This process delayed decision-making until March 2010, with 27 projects eventually contracted 
by August 2010, more than 2 years after the initial call for proposals. Then in 2013, BC Hydro 
announced it was cancelling up to 10 of the executed contracts and deferring delivery on nine 
others (Sun, 12 Sep 2013).  
A government funder attributed the delays to the due diligence process: “They also have 
regulatory people who, not that they’re hostile against technology, but it’s like ‘We need a lot of 
evidence. We need this and that. We need...’ They’re very, very conservative because that’s their 
job” (F05, Government Funder). As a stabilizing mechanism, such due diligence facilitates swift 
action for standard operations, but is designed to impede new initiatives that could threaten the 
system; one industry member reported that it took over a year to obtain environmental approval 
to install a windmill, yet it took 6 weeks to obtain approval to drill an oil well (conference field 
notes). A utility manager acknowledged that as a result, “We’ve had a very high attrition rate… 
almost a 60 percent failure, because of changes in policy,” and that entrepreneurs often were told 
that they had “not thoroughly investigated and put together all the pieces of their project to an 
adequate standard” (F01, Utility Company).  
Doubt about the category combined with the industry’s rigid temporal structuring ensured 
the smooth functioning of the existing system, but made it difficult for entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of opportunities. Due to this temporal complexity, entrepreneurs struggled to entrain 
to existing temporal rhythms characterized by delays and inconsistencies. Although the window 
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of opportunity appeared open, entrepreneurs found it difficult to make progress. 
Unobtrusive maintenance: New entrants are undermined. Although politicians, 
government bodies and incumbent firms had framed cleantech as an urgent imperative and 
publicly committed resources to it, entrepreneurs who pursued the opportunity encountered 
delays and inconsistencies introduced by those same actors and struggled to survive. To meet 
payroll, capital and operating expenses, entrepreneurs required the speed promised in the 
window of opportunity to stay afloat: “Every meeting [with utility] seems to be 3 to 6 months 
apart, and so nothing happens because, you know, when you’re a company like ours and you’re 
starting up, every day is an expense, right? I’ve got payroll, I’ve got rent.” (ECM04, 
Entrepreneur). Similar cases were reported in the media: 
But Siple [an entrepreneur] says that because the review won’t be completed until 
sometime in the new year, his company’s hands are now tied for months. “Our sales have 
stopped. Zero,” Siple said. As sales manager with no sales, he’s looking for work. 
Several employees have been laid off. (Star, 8 Nov 2011) 
 
Others testified to failures within the industry: “So they pulled the grant. I guess times 
were tough economically…The whole industry almost went bankrupt” (ECM16, Entrepreneur).  
They give you enough money just so you can fail, as opposed to if I didn’t have any 
money, then I know what I’ve got to do and I go focus on that. But they de-focus us all 
enough to think that there’s something there for us, and then…we have just enough to 
fail. (EPS11, Entrepreneur) 
 
Even employees of regulatory bodies and incumbent firms acknowledged the challenges 
for entrepreneurs. A utility manager recognized how such challenges directly caused 
entrepreneurs to fail: “Projects fail after they get a contract because they get delayed…There’s 
whole things that can happen, not moving ahead, and then kind of time turns against them” (F01, 
Utility Company). 
 Facing these complexities, entrepreneurs sought alternatives. One entrepreneur described 
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their exit strategy: “Like we…we had a child here, right? Its tidal energy…It was a 7- or 8-year-
old child for us. Our hearts and souls were in this child and then we put it up for adoption” 
(EPS04, Entrepreneur). Another entrepreneur focused on internationalization: “Canada’s not an 
exciting market for us in the biggest picture…The U.S. is our largest market for now. Asia, 
China, India, other parts of the world are significant markets…we don’t see as strong of a market 
here” (ECM17, Entrepreneur). As such, the window of opportunity had been closed, blocking 
entrepreneurs’ market entry. The legitimate stabilizing mechanisms in the regime’s institutional 
infrastructure, including its temporal and evaluation structures, and the framing of doubt about 
the category, undermined entrepreneurs.  
Resource-Based Actions in Response to the Cleantech Issue 
Entrepreneurs responded to the resource commitments announced in the window of opportunity. 
However, regime actors simultaneously extended the category of cleantech to include 
improvements in traditional energy technologies (“cleaner tech”), and because of the evaluation 
structuring, exerted latent category control over the cleantech category. That is, the existing 
economic value calculus, a legitimate stabilizing mechanism of the institutional infrastructure, 
dominated opportunity evaluation in the cleantech category. We refer to this control as latent 
since no overt action was required to control the cleantech category as long as the economic 
value calculus was accepted as the legitimate evaluative criterion. This control allowed 
incumbents to absorb most of the resource commitments, bolstering them as providers of 
cleantech.  
Category extension. Based on the evaluation structuring of the regime, politicians and 
incumbents extended the cleantech category to include a wider range of technologies, both 
cleantech and “cleaner tech,” as one regulator explained: 
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The cleantech definition as is most broadly being utilized, I suppose, is not limited to 
clean energy technology, although it does tend to be dominated by clean energy 
technology—at least in the [provincial] context, but in other contexts as well. But it does 
also include some areas of interest to [the province] beyond clean energy technology. 
We’re clearly and obviously very interested in clean energy technology, as I’m sure you 
will have noted from many of our policies and legislative approaches and program 
design. But it does also include things like environmental management, environmental 
remediation, wastewater treatment and other, as you’ve noted earlier, clean—cleaner 
ways of doing things in the technology space. Just so that those very important 
opportunities are not overlooked in the [provincial] context. (F02, Regulator) 
 
Similarly, a gas company executive said replacing oil and coal with “increasingly abundant and 
cleaner burning natural gas is another part of the solution” (Sun, 25 Mar 2010). As such, the 
category of cleantech “covers a range of continuous improvement-type energy technology 
development” (F02, Regulator). This extended definition of cleantech was embedded in 
institutional structures, such as the SDTC’s seven project categories, among which two were 
“unconventional oil & gas” and “clean fossil fuel.”  
 As such, the category of cleantech was broadened to include these “cleaner tech” 
innovations and the new breadth was built into the structures that guided decision-making. When 
evaluating new opportunities, radical cleantech innovations were thus competing against more 
incremental efficiency and waste management improvements in traditional technologies for 
which it was easier to make a business case since economic evaluations were privileged. 
Latent category control. Despite announcing resource commitments for cleantech, when 
deciding on resource allocation, economic criteria associated with the regime’s existing value 
calculus dominated. “The metrics we’re asked to put around it are jobs and leveraged money 
[matching private sector investments], but jobs is way up there on the top because it’s so 
important to [the province]” (F05, Government Funder). While economic trade-offs were 
explicitly recognized, environmental measures were considered, but, “again, within the confines 
of other things that have to be balanced corporately, within the provincial budgets, etc.” (F02, 
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Regulator). As one regulator articulated, when evaluating the array of innovations, upfront 
investment in cleantech projects was a huge barrier, compared to investments in traditional 
energy infrastructure for which capital costs had been paid long ago: 
The kicker with geothermal projects is they’re very expensive up front. They’re very 
capital intensive, particularly in the areas where the resources exist. [Geothermal is] in 
very rugged mountainous terrain and you’re having to use the same equipment that the oil 
and gas industry uses to drill several kilometres down to get into the sufficient 
temperature zones… it is very expensive. (F02, Regulator) 
 
Oil and gas companies benefit from tax policies which subsidize their activities. The 
International Institute for Sustainable Development “put the amount of subsidies to the oil 
industry by Canadian federal and provincial governments at $2.84 billion in 2008” (Sun, 21 Jul 
2011). While old subsidies for traditional technologies were essentially hidden because they had 
become taken for granted parts of repeating budgets, new subsidies for cleantech were called out 
and problematized. For example, a political leader in Ontario decried “rich subsidies for costly 
industrial wind farms we don’t need” (Star, 19 Apr 2013). The Toronto Star reported that despite 
subsidies to incumbents that exceeded those to cleantech, “the fossil fuel and nuclear industries 
are screaming foul, conveniently ignoring the public handouts they have enjoyed for decades” (1 
Oct 2011).  
 The success of cleantech funding programs thus was measured by economic impact:  
We brought in KPMG to do an impact evaluation… The lens that they looked at it 
through was primarily economic impact. So, of course innovation has a number of 
potential beneficial impacts, not the least of which new knowledge and new social 
outcomes and better environment, better health technologies, those kinds of things. Some 
of those are difficult to quantify and evaluate, particularly in the short term, but economic 
impact, when we look at things like jobs, leveraged investment, hard-nosed stuff, that 
was really the focus of the KPMG evaluation. (F05, Government Funder) 
 
 What is important to note here is that the disruptive potential of cleantech rested on its 
ability to deliver non-monetary benefits: reductions in carbon emissions. It is normal for 
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emerging technologies not to be economically competitive with existing technologies initially, 
but if they promise other benefits (e.g., ecological), governments and other investors often invest 
hoping that economic competitiveness will materialize later through economies of scale and 
additional technological development. Typically, governments invest in new technology 
development to support it while it is being proven.5  
 However, the evaluation of new opportunities was dominated by the economic value 
calculus of the regime as it exerted latent control of the clean tech category. These evaluation 
criteria, which guided the procedures for project selection and evaluation, privileged applications 
by large incumbent firms in “cleaner” technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, since 
these firms could invest their own capital (increasing the leveraged investment measures). 
Moreover, projects had shorter payback timeframes because previously agreed upon subsidies 
and investments in infrastructure were not included in the analysis, and risks were seen as lower 
because proven actors were investing in more certain projects.  
 Unobtrusive maintenance: Incumbents are bolstered. Because the category was extended 
to include a wider range of technologies and was controlled by economic evaluation criteria, 
“cleaner” technologies forwarded by incumbents were privileged by regulators and government 
funders to meet cleantech resource commitments. For example: “There continues to be some 
alternative energy issues, but I think you’ll see a bit of a focus now on more of the conventional 
energy and a better utilization of it” (Sun, 9 Mar 2012), with investments such as a “$238 million 
‘green science fund for fuel-cell, clean-coal and nuclear-energy research’” (Star, 19 Jan 2007). 
One regulator explained: “The province is uniquely positioned to capitalize on some of our 
existing assets and our existing resource base and our existing policy environment to see this 
sector or this area of the economy grow and expand” (F02, Regulator).  
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 Among the STDC’s cleantech categories, the “unconventional oil & gas” category 
included funding for major oil producers to develop a warm solvent to replace water for oil 
extraction, and funding for a major oil and gas transmission pipeline firm to develop a self-
monitoring composite pipe that could replace a corroded or compromised pipe without the need 
to excavate. The “clean fossil fuels” category included funding for a less expensive bitumen 
diluent, as well as a field-upgrading technology aimed at reducing capital costs by 50%, 
operating costs by 30% and greenhouse gases by only 6%. Similarly, a report by Canada’s 
Auditor General claimed that Pacific Carbon Trust, a BC government organization that provided 
grants to carbon reduction projects, gave millions in grants to recipients, including oil and gas 
companies, for projects that were legally required or would be implemented regardless of the 
grants in order to save costs (Sun, 30 Jun 2012).  
Media and activists criticized spending on “cleaner tech.” For example, of the $2 billion 
in funding provided by the federal government to promote “clean, green technologies that fight 
climate change,” $200 million was earmarked for energy efficiency, fuel cells and renewable 
energy and $1.55 billion remained unspecified; however, media reports indicate that the oil, gas 
and coal industries received a significant tax break at this time (Sun, 19 Feb 2003). When carbon 
capture and storage technology received subsidies allocated to cleantech, activists argued: “We 
definitely don’t think Canadians…should be paying to clean up industries’ pollution,” and “the 
concept of polluter pay is apparently too complicated for the oil industry” (Sun, 5 Feb 2008).  
The stabilizing mechanisms of the institutional infrastructure led to category extension 
and latent category control that favored existing regime actors. The resource commitments to 
cleantech thus were absorbed by incumbents, bolstering their position in the market. 
Unobtrusive Maintenance: Disruption Avoided 
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As of 2011, after the window of opportunity was opened during an intense period of 
resource commitments and regulation to accelerate the adoption of clean technology, 97% of 
Ontario’s electric energy continued to be supplied by nuclear (57%), hydro (22%), natural gas 
(15%), and coal and oil (3%). Collectively, solar, wind and biomass only accounted for 3% of 
the province’s supply. Likewise, non-hydro renewable energy production accounted for less than 
3% of the national energy supply. Entrepreneurs were stymied by the contradiction: “So on one 
hand we [society] say we want to be green, we want to do this stuff, but on the other hand, we 
have much higher, other priorities” (ECM08, Entrepreneur). In the meantime, starved of 
resources and delayed or blocked from accessing markets by the temporal and category effects of 
the interlocking socio-technical regime, cleantech entrepreneurs frequently failed, performed 
poorly, or left Canada to pursue international markets.  
Thus, as one entrepreneur described, incumbents were winning the “war of attrition” 
(PSCS1, Entrepreneur). The lack of progress in renewable energy generation and underlying 
clean technologies, and the absorption of government funding by incumbents suggest that the 
socio-technical regime was maintained and disruption was avoided. 
DISCUSSION 
We have presented an analysis of incumbents’ responses to potentially disruptive innovations 
when overt resistance to such innovations would not be considered legitimate. We found that 
incumbents and other regime actors (politicians and other government actors) deployed time- and 
resource-based actions to signal legitimate action on the issue of cleantech. At the same time, the 
legitimate stabilizing mechanisms of the existing institutional infrastructure enabled them to 
absorb the cleantech category and its associated resources, thereby undermining potential 
disruptors. Ultimately, incumbents’ unobtrusive maintenance work resulted in a largely 
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unchanged socio-technical regime, with some incremental environmental improvements in 
incumbent technologies frequently funded largely by taxpayers.  
 While our data do not allow us to assess incumbents’ and political actors’ intentions with 
respect to this maintenance work, we outline three possible scenarios: weak intentionality based 
on habitual reproduction, strong intentionality based on Machiavellian self-interest seeking with 
guile, and moderate intentionality based on basic self-interest seeking.  
 An assumption of weak intentionality would suggest that incumbent actors and 
political/regulatory actors intended to be supportive of cleantech in line with their public 
statements and intended to follow through on their resource commitments, but their habitual 
enactment of institutional prescriptions got in the way. For example, because stability of the 
electrical grid was important to utilities and required exceptional due diligence, and because 
approval from the utility regulator was required and took time, delays in the process were 
inevitable. These could be attributed simply to the systemic asynchronies that arise in many new 
technology developments, such as unanticipated roadblocks (Pickering, 1993) and delays in the 
emergence of supportive infrastructure (Ansari & Garud, 2009). Similarly, it could be argued 
that political exigencies shifted, and funds were no longer available for cleantech. Further, it 
could be seen as very natural that economic metrics would be the primary means of evaluating 
investments in cleantech, because economic metrics dominate most business decision-making 
processes.  
 However, internal inconsistencies abound in this set of arguments for weak intentionality. 
First, the utility took over 2 years to announce the results of its request for proposals related to 
independent power production. However, according to its website,6 the utility had been 
purchasing independently produced energy and connecting it to the grid since the 1980s, thus 
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negating the argument that supportive infrastructure was not available, or that extensive due 
diligence was required due to a lack of familiarity with the technology. Furthermore, while the 
utility needed the approval of its regulator to purchase independent power, it waited until after 
the deadline for its request for proposals before asking the regulator to exempt it from purchasing 
independent power, creating additional delays. Additionally, even after it announced purchase 
agreements, it later cancelled many of them. With respect to government funding for cleantech, 
in most cases, many of the funds allocated to cleantech were not cancelled, but were distributed 
to incumbents based primarily on an economic value calculus, despite statements in 
announcements and on websites7 that placed ecological criteria first. Finally, the extension of the 
cleantech category to include “cleaner tech” is hard to interpret as habitual action with weak 
intentionality, since it involves deviating from the status quo. 
 In contrast, an assumption of strong intentionality would suggest that incumbents and 
political actors framed a window of opportunity around cleantech with the express purpose of 
luring in unsuspecting entrepreneurs, then crippling them with delays, changes in funding 
allocations, and absorption of the cleantech category, thereby winning the “war of attrition,” as 
one entrepreneur framed it. The entrepreneurs’ failure to thrive would publicly demonstrate that 
cleantech was “not ready yet,” absolving incumbents from delivering on their window of 
opportunity framing and resource commitments, and thereby rendering “cleaner tech” the only 
legitimate response to ecological concerns. We feel the strong form of intentionality, equivalent 
to pre-meditated assault, is not credible either, since it would require significant scheming and 
hypermuscular coordination among incumbents and political and regulatory actors across 
different industries and jurisdictions. 
 The assumption of moderate intentionality is more credible because it suggests only that 
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incumbents and regime actors sought to maintain institutional arrangements which were in their 
own best interests. Entrepreneurs were collateral damage in self-defense actions, not victims of 
premeditated violence. We suggest that when pressured, it makes sense for actors in a regime to 
use positive rhetoric and make (symbolic) resource commitments to signal that they are working 
on an issue in an effort to gain legitimacy, as shown in other contexts (see e.g., Zietsma & 
Lawrence, 2010). Furthermore, when political directives are in a constant state of flux, it is 
perfectly reasonable for utilities to delay implementation as long as possible since the rules could 
change at any time. Similarly, it is perfectly reasonable for oil and gas companies to try to attract 
government cleantech funding for projects that make their own operations a little cleaner, and it 
is perfectly reasonable for political actors to fund “clear winners”—projects that show low risk, 
promise job creation and support a nationally important industry. Interpreted from each actor’s 
own set of institutional norms and constraints, each action is defensible, which is why we label 
the stabilizing mechanisms as “legitimate.” While our data cannot definitively determine which 
form of intentionality was operating in this context, we argue that this moderate form of 
intentionality featuring institutionally-influenced self-interest seeking is most consistent with the 
data patterns we observed. Regardless of the intentions of incumbent and regime actors, our 
study makes several contributions to the literatures on disruptive innovation and institutional 
maintenance.  
Contributions to the Literatures on Disruptive Innovation and Institutional Maintenance  
In the literature on disruptive innovation, scholars have focused primarily on successful 
disruption by studying incumbent failure (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986; Daneels, 2004) or adaptation (e.g., Lange, Boivie, & Henderson, 2009; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Howells, 2002). Furthermore, with few exceptions, researchers have concentrated 
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solely on the dynamic interactions between incumbents and challengers. Using insights from 
institutional theory, we have focused instead on the avoidance of disruption through the 
unobtrusive maintenance work of incumbents and other regime actors. Moreover, in contrast to 
previous studies in which scholars viewed incumbent resistance as unproblematic (e.g., Ansari et 
al., 2016b; Garud et al., 2002; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015), social demands for action on cleantech in 
our context meant that overt resistance and purely symbolic action likely would have been 
deemed illegitimate. Nonetheless, incumbents found ways to avoid changes to the field and their 
positions within it. Our study’s focus delivers unique and valuable insights to the disruptive 
innovation literature by overcoming the success bias, and looking beyond simplistic conceptions 
of hypermuscular agency to understand disruptive innovation at the field or regime level.  
We have used institutional theory to shed light on how incumbents and other regime 
actors were able to unobtrusively avoid legitimate demands. Although technological innovation 
is a recognized source of institutional change (see, e.g., Barley, 1986; Greve & Taylor, 2000; 
Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Ansari & Phillips, 2011), few have considered institutional theory in 
tandem with disruptive innovation. We contend that institutional theory provides interesting 
insights into disruptive innovation processes, because the theory focuses specifically on what 
makes change difficult. Institutions, as “repetitively activated, socially constructed controls,” 
(Jepperson, 1991: 145) are legitimate stabilizing mechanisms that interlock with other 
institutions in an infrastructure that is often difficult for outsiders to penetrate. The institutions 
themselves work to maintain status quo arrangements; when incumbents and other regime actors 
activate them in particular ways, they often are able to resist even legitimate social pressures for 
change, maintaining the existing arrangements which privilege them (Fligstein, 2001; Garud et 
al., 2002; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). We have shown how incumbents framed a window of 
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opportunity around cleantech through urgent rhetoric and resource commitments, thus bolstering 
their legitimacy by appearing to respond to the cleantech issue. However, they simultaneously 
activated legitimate stabilizing mechanisms (i.e., temporal structuring and evaluation structuring) 
that supported the existing infrastructure of the socio-technical regime, which simultaneously 
bolstered their dominant position and legitimacy. The undermining of potential disruptors was 
collateral damage. 
Temporal structuring as a legitimate stabilizing mechanism leading to temporal complexity 
Temporal structuring involves entraining new entrants to the integrated temporal cycles of 
regime actors, in this case, political actors and incumbents. It was perfectly legitimate for each 
type of actor to behave in the usual way in accordance with typical temporal rhythms. However, 
intermittent political and bureaucratic government and incumbent temporal structures were 
anathema to entrepreneurs who needed the speed that seemed to be promised in the window of 
opportunity framing. Temporal complexity refers to “multiple temporal rhythms and experiences 
rather than…a single linear conception of time” (Garud et al., 2013: 793). The temporal 
complexity created by the requirement to manage three vastly different sets of timing norms had 
the effect of undermining new entrants. As new entrants failed to thrive, they validated the 
incumbents’ and regime actors’ rhetoric that the clean tech category was “not ready yet” for 
adoption.  
 In a review of the innovation literature, Garud et al. (2013) noted the effects of temporal 
complexity in innovation processes, describing how differences in timing norms can lead to 
roadblocks, delays and partial implementation (see, e.g., Ansari & Garud, 2009; Pickering, 
1993). While our data do not allow us to infer that incumbents and other regime actors 
deliberately used delays and temporal complexity to undermine entrepreneurs, they do point to 
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the ways in which temporal structures enacted by regime actors can contribute significantly to 
institutional maintenance in the face of demands for change. In fact, temporal effects are ideal 
for performing unobtrusive maintenance because temporal rhythms are systemic rather than 
episodic structures (Lawrence, Winn & Jennings, 2001), thus actions appear to be inevitable 
rather than malevolent, intentional strategies to resist institutional pressures. In our study, the 
overt actions incumbents took in support of cleantech (i.e., framing a window of opportunity, 
committing resources) helped build legitimacy for incumbents. Enacting legitimate stabilizing 
mechanisms did not appear to detract from their legitimacy significantly even though these 
mechanisms enabled unobtrusive maintenance. Similar to recent work showing how change can 
occur unobtrusively through everyday practices (Smets, Morris & Greenwood, 2011), such 
unobtrusive maintenance does not necessitate visibly conscious and active institutional work and 
thus may have fewer negative legitimacy implications for the resisters. Our findings therefore 
provide insight into unobtrusive forces that help avert disruptive innovation, and suggest that 
potential disrupters would benefit by assessing the temporal rhythms they face in disruption and 
plan accordingly. Indeed, windows of opportunity may in fact be more closed than they appear 
because temporal complexity inhibits market entry. 
 Institutional theorists are beginning to take a greater interest in temporal rhythms. 
Scholars have revealed the work required by entrepreneurs to manage temporal complexity 
(Granqvist & Gustafsson, 2016; Reineke & Ansari, 2015; Slawinski & Bansal, 2015) to support 
efforts for institutional change. We extend this work by showing how temporal complexity can 
block change and disruptive innovation, leading to institutional maintenance.  
Evaluation structuring as a legitimate stabilizing mechanism leading to category hijacking 
Often, innovation is disruptive precisely because it redefines the evaluation criteria for a 
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particular technology or business area. When regime actors can instead repeatedly activate a 
value calculus that privileges status quo metrics, new entrants may be undermined based on their 
performance against these legitimated metrics, while attention is directed away from the metrics 
on which disruptors excel (in this case, ecological performance), effectively giving the regime 
latent category control. Economic metrics in this context were legitimate in that they were 
comprehensible, taken-for-granted and normatively justified. Activating evaluation structuring as 
a stabilizing mechanism enables incumbents and political actors to not only excuse their own 
mediocre support for cleantech, but also justify the extension of the cleantech category to include 
their own “cleaner tech,” allowing incumbents to absorb category resources. Such recategorizing 
work can yield substantial benefits for firms or industries (Vergne, 2012), as strategically 
promoting certain attributes (and not others) of categories can privilege particular actors 
(Gehman & Grimes, 2017) in terms of both legitimacy and resource access, as was the case in 
our context. When disruptive innovators attempt to introduce new or refined categories with 
different criteria, category language and attributes can be hijacked by incumbents as they frame 
themselves as category members, and then dictate the use of previously legitimated metrics to 
convey or evaluate the category’s value. The lesson for potentially disruptive innovators is to 
focus heavily on controlling evaluation criteria in new or refined categories to avoid latent 
category control (and category hijacking) by incumbents. While Govindarajan and Kopalle 
(2006) suggested that researchers pay attention to how disruptors can disrupt by offering new 
value propositions despite having mainstream attributes, our findings suggest that such a strategy 
opens possibilities for incumbents to engage in institutional maintenance via evaluation 
structuring, thereby helping them to avoid disruption. Further research is required to understand 




 These findings also contribute to an improved understanding of institutional maintenance. 
In prior work, scholars have focused on efforts such as valorizing or demonizing, and deterring 
or enabling an institution (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006); however, such overt work is likely to be 
seen as illegitimate in a context like ours where the innovation being defended against is seen as 
socially desirable. By focusing instead on a legitimate value calculus, institutional maintenance 
in our context was unobtrusive—that is, choosing cleaner tech over cleantech made sense based 
on economic value criteria. Economic sociologists like Callon and Muniesa (2005: 1229) 
clarified that calculation counts, and that “in order to be calculated, goods must be calculable.” In 
many ways, the reversion to economic criteria seems natural (and is taken for granted), because 
they seem more calculable than other criteria. Yet, ecological performance also is calculable, as 
is the cost of infrastructure depreciation for hydro dams, and the cost of subsidies to oil and gas 
companies. These “disappeared” in our context, however, by a consistent focus on interpretations 
of economic criteria that privileged incumbents, and which appeared legitimate because they 
were used regularly. Our findings illustrate how incumbents and other regime actors have agency 
to maintain institutions within their institutional sphere by activating legitimate stabilizing 
mechanisms (i.e., temporal and evaluation structuring). The (selective) reproduction of existing 
structures helps incumbents avoid disruption: the institutional infrastructure of the field provides 
regime actors with an arsenal of legitimate stabilizing mechanisms which can be activated that 
are justified by longstanding beliefs and values in the field, but which nonetheless can help avoid 
even socially desired disruptive innovations.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The literature on disruptive innovation is rarely integrated with the literature on institutional 
43 
 
change, despite the fact that such innovation often creates institutional change. Our findings 
suggest that more deliberate attempts to integrate insights from both literatures would be fruitful, 
since the notions of legitimacy and stable social structures clearly are important to disruptive 
innovation, and institutional theorists could learn from literature that examines how innovations 
become adopted. Both literatures could benefit from more attention to the avoidance of potential 
disruption, since a success bias tends to affect both institutional theory and disruptive innovation 
studies. Furthermore, scholars in both areas should look beyond challengers and incumbents and 
focus on other actors who are influential in the socio-technical regime.  
 We note three important boundary conditions for the study. First, we focused on 
disruptive pressures that are perceived as legitimate by external audiences. Second, we focused 
on a context which was politically important, creating regulatory and political dynamics that 
strengthened the effects of incumbent responses. Third, we focused on a situation characterized 
by resource-dependency on incumbents in which entrepreneurial firms faced what Ansari et al. 
(2016b: 1829) called “a disrupter’s dilemma.” It is likely that the ability of incumbents to 
successfully defend against entrepreneurial entry would be diminished in other settings where 
incumbents are less important to political actors and have less resource control. These situations 
are not rare, particularly since more and more transactions are managed through platforms 
involving ecosystems of related actors. As a result, our findings call attention to important 
factors which should be studied further to reveal their influences under various conditions. 
 Finally, and on a practical note, because disruptive innovations often are seen as creating 
new sources of value, particularly when they address social issues that impact quality of life, our 
findings may appear disheartening. The clear barriers to clean technology innovation identified 
in this study suggest significant limits to what we can expect in terms of innovation when both 
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incumbents and political actors benefit from the continuation of existing regimes, even when 
they overtly support such innovations. Those focusing on wicked problems in society, disruptive 
entrepreneurship and social change initiatives in general are well advised to attend to the 
interests of actors in their environments, and to understand the institutional effects that support 
their unobtrusive maintenance. While our findings shed light on these institutional effects that 
maintain status quo arrangements, we acknowledge that scholars have identified effective tools 
that support institutional change, and suggest that actors who are trying to make socially 
desirable change may be able to counteract unobtrusive maintenance using these same tools. 
Furthermore, if these actors are successful in effecting change, new arrangements are likely to be 
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Table I: Time- and Resource-based Actions and Institutional Maintenance Outcomes 
Construct Representative Quotes 
Framing a window of opportunity 







“This is an area of significant growth and the province is uniquely positioned to capitalize 
on some of our existing assets and our existing resource base and our existing policy 
environment to see this sector or this area of the economy grow and expand…we have the 
full abundance and variety and array of clean energy resources. That bodes well, I think, 
for the sector and is a—I think it’s a flag of where things are going and what their 
opportunities are in the future.” (F02, Regulator) 
“McGuinty [Ontario premier]…noted the bill will ‘address local bylaws and regulations 
that are used to delay or stop proposed renewable energy projects’” (Star, 11 Feb 2009) 
Announcing resource 
commitments 
“Another program that was created as an offspring of the energy—the [action plan]—was 
... a bioenergy strategy, which I was very involved in. One of the key features of the 
bioenergy strategy was the creation of a $25 million bioenergy network. The network is 
focused on a number of things related to encouraging bioenergy development in British 
Columbia, but one of the things it can do with the…one-time $25 million endowment it 
received was support bioenergy technology development and deployment as well.” (F02, 
Regulator) 
“We also have some other fairly significant, driving legislative pieces and policy pieces, 
such as the [action plan] and the suite of [legislation]…The [action plan] established a 
number of policy actions and also some funding mechanisms, some funding programs.” 
(F02, Regulator) 
Infrastructural elements of the socio-technical regime 








“It depends if you ask us now or you ask us at the end of October because quite frankly, 
after an election it depends on where you want to go with these programs…So if the 
program shuts down then we can fire five people.” (F05, Government Funder) 
“This ministry and this agenda is a creature of the government’s economic agenda and 
little more. A government could make choices at any time, and one would expect that 
certainly following an election, is usually one of those times that governments make hard-
nosed choices either to do more of, do less of, or something in between.” (F05, 
Government Funder)  
“Someone has an obligation to maintain power quality. Someone has an obligation to 
provide that product in a cost effective, very safe, reliable manner…the deeper question 
here is, how do you introduce a more decentralized approach to electricity, yet maintain 
the quality and safety and reliability that’s fundamental to our society?” (F01, Utility 
Company) 
“Every contract that we sign, every amendment in the contract, has to have [the 
regulator’s] approval...so we have needed a strong interface. So that involves very 
lengthy…like my whole thing would get filled here with…six or seven binder applications 
to [the regulator], and then significant econometrics and those kind of analysis around 
different submissions.” (F01, Utility Company)  
  Evaluation  
  structuring 
  
  
“I look at leverage. For every dollar that we put in, there’s two-and-a-half dollars of 
private sector money.” (F05, Government Funder) 
“There’s an intrinsic goal to grow your rate base, because that’s how you increase your 
rate of return.” (F01, Utility Company) 
“As we would hope any prudent holder of public funds would do, they want to be satisfied 
that there’s a good management team and a good business plan, a good commercialization 
road map…They need to have a requisite degree of comfort to make their investment and 
that’s not dissimilar from the approach we would take as well.” (F02, Regulator) 
Temporal actions in response to the cleantech issue 
Category doubt “There are roadblocks, for lack of a better word, for Environment and Energy. Because 
that’s just the nature of where the technologies are.” (F05, Government Funder) 
“No one could seriously propose replacing all of Ontario’s nuclear power exclusively with 
wind.” (Star, 7 May 2011) 
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Temporal complexity  “It won't be a fast process. Chris Tyrrell, chief conservation officer of Toronto Hydro, says 
two years of data will be needed to make a decision on whether to proceed.” (Star, 11 Jun 
2010)  
“‘We’re going to have to do a pilot first.’ A pilot? I’ve done 32. I mean how many more 
beta sites do we need to do?...I said, ‘How big a pilot do you want to do?’ He says, ‘Six.’ I 
said, ‘Alright.’ ‘How soon do you think you can get those six in?’ I said, ‘Within 90 days’ 
…Do you know how long it took them to do the audit? Eighteen months!” (ECM04, 
Entrepreneur) 
“You’ve got to do all the paperwork and it takes time and there’s the length of churn for 
them to go through their cycles and that can be a little frustrating.” (EPS12, Entrepreneur) 
Resource-based actions in response to the cleantech threat 
Category extension “Well it’s tough in this jurisdiction because now…95 percent [of current power 
generation] is clean.” (F01, Utility Company) 
 “We’ve instead chosen to tailor and target our intended feed-in tariff to encourage 
emerging new clean technologies…and/or to focus on specific regional deployments 
where a broader range of clean energy resource development could offset or reduce 
reliance on diesel-fired generation in remote communities, for example.” (F02, Regulator) 
Latent category 
control  
   
“The [Utility] can really reduce attrition by really ramping up their qualifications for 
people that are going to participate…you can structure things in a way that the only people 
that can participate are people that have this predevelopment capital.” (F01, Utility 
Company) 
“I don’t think that debate is going to shift, because at the end of the day, rates going up is 




“Government of [another province] announced five projects today in renewable and 
alternative energy…So if we get one of those awards, we’ll go ahead. If we don’t, we’ll 
close our offices and do something else.” (EPS05, Entrepreneur). 
“[When solar subsidies were cut by 27%,] the industry was blindsided. Many solar 
installers had already ordered inventory, put down deposits, and hired and trained staff to 
meet expected demand” (Star, 19 Jul 2010). 
Incumbents are 
bolstered 
“To support the development and deployment of innovative clean energy technologies… 
and also to encourage improvements in conventional energy use…It covers a range of 
continuous improvement-type energy technology development.” (F02, Regulator) 
“It’s both a blessing for us here in British Columbia to have had for many decades a 
reliable source of clean electricity that has provided...that has been paid for long ago, so all 
we’re really paying for right now in the utilization of electricity is the cost of operating the 







Figure 1: The Socio-technical Regime Facing Clean Technology Firms in Canada 
 
 













2 Exceptions include large industrial or institutional users which produce power to supplement their grid-tied power use, or remote, non-grid tied communities 
which supplement their use of fossil fuel generators. Similarly, a small number of users retrofit their own equipment for biofuel and acquire or produce biofuel 
for their own use.  
3 http://www.neb.gc.ca/bts/whwr/rgnztnndstrctr/brdmmbr/brdmmbr-eng.html#s3 
4 https://www.bchydro.com/content/dam/hydro/medialib/internet/documents/planning_regulatory/acquiring_power /2010q3/cpc_rfp_process_report.pdf. 
5 For example, Mark Walsh and Matt Weinberg of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s Office of Investment and Innovation stated: “Unlike the 
professionally managed funds that are driven to maximize profit for their limited partners and investors, the government’s bottom line is not profit. That makes 
its work fundamentally different. Because of this difference, the federal government has for centuries been investing in moonshot ideas that have led to 
groundbreaking technological advancement, new market creation and significant improvements in the lives of ordinary Americans.” 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/03/your-federal-government-drives-innovation-by-investing-in-moonshots/, accessed 25 Feb 2018. 
6 https://www.bchydro.com/work-with-us/selling-clean-energy/meeting-energy-needs.html.  
7 For example, the eligibility section of Sustainable Development Technology Canada’s website indicates: “SDTC’s mandate is to fund projects that support 
Canadian small and medium size enterprises advancing innovative technologies that are pre-commercial and have the potential to demonstrate significant and 
quantifiable environmental and economic benefits in one or more of the following areas: climate change, clean air, clean water and clean soil.” 
https://www.sdtc.ca/en/apply/eligibility-and-evaluation.  
                                                            
